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A MODEL REGIME OF PRIVACY PROTECTION 
Version 2.0 
 
by  
Daniel J. Solove1 & Chris Jay Hoofnagle2 
April 5, 2005 
 
This version incorporates and responds to the many comments that we received to 
Version 1.1, which we released on March 10, 2005. 
 
Privacy protection in the United States has often been criticized, but critics have too 
infrequently suggested specific proposals for reform.  Recently, there has been significant 
legislative interest at both the federal and state levels in addressing the privacy of personal 
information.  This was sparked when ChoicePoint, one of the largest data brokers in the United 
States with records on almost every adult American citizen, sold data on about 145,000 people to 
fraudulent businesses set up by identity thieves.3  Other companies announced security breaches, 
including LexisNexis, from which personal information about 32,000 people was improperly 
accessed.4 Senator Schumer criticized Westlaw for making available to certain subscribers 
personal information including Social Security Numbers (SSNs).5      
In the aftermath of the ChoicePoint debacle and other major information security 
breaches, both of us have been asked by Congressional legislative staffers, state legislative 
policymakers, journalists, academics, and others about what specifically should be done to better 
regulate information privacy.  In response to these questions, we believe that it is imperative to 
have a discussion of concrete legislative solutions to privacy problems. 
What appears below is our attempt at such an endeavor.  Privacy experts have long 
suggested that information collection be consistent with Fair Information Practices.  This Model 
Regime incorporates many of those practices and applies them specifically to the context of 
commercial data brokers such as ChoicePoint. We hope that this will provide useful guidance to 
legislators and policymakers in crafting laws and regulations.  We also intend this to be a work-
in-progress in which we collaborate with others.  We have welcomed input from other 
academics, policymakers, journalists, and experts as well as from the industries and businesses 
that will be subject to the regulations we propose.  We have incorporated criticisms and 
                                                 
1 Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School; JD Yale.  Professor Solove has discussed 
many of the problems and solutions herein in his book, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE (2004). 
2 Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center West Coast Office; JD U. Georgia.  Chris Hoofnagle has discussed 
many of the problems and solutions herein in his articles, Big Brother’s Little Helpers, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=582302; and Putting Identity Theft on Ice: Freezing Credit Reports to Prevent Lending to 
Impostors, http://ssrn.com/abstract=679581. Marc Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy Information Center and Beth 
Givens of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse have provided substantial comments which are incorporated in Version 
1.1. 
3 Bob Sullivan, Database Giant Gave Access to Fake Firms, MSNBC, Feb. 14, 2005, at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6969799/; Joseph Menn, Did the ChoicePoint End Run Backfire? L.A. Times, Mar. 
13, 2005. 
4 Ellen Simon, U.S. Citizens’ Data Possibly Compromised, S.F. Chronicle, Mar. 9, 2005.  
5 Ken Fireman, Schumer Slams Legal Service on SS Nos., Newsday, Feb. 25, 2005.  
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constructive suggestions, and we will continue to update this Model Regime to include the 
comments we find most helpful and illuminating.  
 
Daniel J. Solove        Chris Jay Hoofnagle 
dsolove@law.gwu.edu       hoofnagle@epic.org 
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I. U.S. PRIVACY LAW AND THE DATABASE INDUSTRY 
 
Currently, the collection and use of personal data by businesses and the government is 
spinning out of control.  An entire industry devoted primarily to processing and disseminating 
personal information has arisen, and this industry is not well-regulated.  Many companies 
brokering in data have found ways to avoid being regulated by the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA), a landmark law passed in 1970 to regulate consumer reporting agencies.6  Increasingly, 
the government is relying on data broker companies to supply personal data for intelligence and 
law enforcement purposes as well as to analyze it.  As a result, the government is navigating 
around the protections of the Privacy Act,7 a law passed in 1974 to regulate the collection and 
use of data by government agencies.  The FCRA and Privacy Act form the basic framework that 
regulates a large portion of the flow of personal data, but this framework is riddled with 
exceptions and shunted with limitations.  We propose a Model Regime of Privacy Protection to 
address these problems. 
 
A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act 
 
The database industry has its roots in the rise of consumer reporting agencies -- 
companies that gather and sell personal information on individuals for business purposes.  The 
consumer reporting industry began over a century ago.  The first major consumer reporting 
agency, Retail Credit Co., was founded in 1899, and over the years, it grew in size and expanded 
its business into selling reports about individuals to insurers and employers.8    
By the 1960s, significant controversy surrounded the credit reporting agencies. There 
were questionable practices in the industry, including requirements that investigators fill quotas 
of negative information on data subjects.9  To do this, some investigators fabricated negative 
information, others included incomplete information.10  Additionally, the investigators were 
collecting “lifestyle” information on data subjects, including their sexual orientation, marital 
situation, drinking habits, and cleanliness.11 The credit reporting agencies were maintaining 
outdated information, and in some cases, providing the file to law enforcement and to 
unauthorized persons. Individuals had no right to see what was in their files.  Public exposure of 
the industry resulted in an extensive congressional inquiry, and it ultimately led to the passage of 
the FCRA in 1970.12   
The FCRA was the first federal law to regulate private-sector use and disclosure of 
personal information.  At the most basic level, the FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies 
to maintain procedures to ensure “maximum possible accuracy.”13  The law regulates the 
collection, maintenance, and dissemination of “consumer reports.”  Consumer reports can only 
be used for a series of enumerated purposes, such as for determining eligibility for credit or 
                                                 
6 Pub. L. No. 90-321, 15 U.S.C. § 1681.   
7 Pub. L. No. 93-579, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
8 ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN'S WEB SITE, PRIVACY AND SECURITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE 
INTERNET 316 (2000).   
9 Id. at 316-21 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Pub. L. No. P.L. 90-321 (May 29, 1968).  
13 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 
SOLOVE & HOOFNAGLE   MODEL PRIVACY REGIME 
 4 
engaging in employment background checks.14  Consumer reporting agencies must allow people 
access to their records and must provide a telephone number for people to call in the event of a 
complaint.15 Consumer reporting agencies must investigate any mistakes that people point out in 
their files.16  Any user of a credit report that takes adverse action on a person based on a 
consumer report must notify the person about this fact.17  When employers (both perspective and 
current) want to examine a person’s credit report, they must first obtain the person’s consent.18  
If the employer takes any adverse action based on the report, the employer must inform the 
person and provide instructions to obtain a copy of the report.19  Under the FCRA, law 
enforcement has a number of avenues to access consumer reports, some of which require an 
annual accounting to Congress. Full consumer reports can be accessed by court order, by grand 
jury subpoena, or by request of a child support enforcement agency.20  The Act allows the FBI 
access to individuals’ account information and identifying information for counterintelligence 
purposes upon written request.21   
 
B. The Privacy Act 
 
The Privacy Act of 1974 was created in response to concerns about how the creation and 
use of computerized databases might impact individuals’ privacy rights.22  As technology 
advanced through the 1960s and 70s, it became easier for agencies to cross-reference 
individuals’ personal data. Citizens and legislators began to contemplate the ways that this 
information, if compiled, could be abused.  In 1973, the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) issued a report  recommending that Congress enact legislation adopting a Code 
of Fair Information Practices for record systems containing personal data.23  This Code consisted 
of the following principles: 
 
x There must be no personal data record-keeping system whose very existence is secret. 
x There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is in a record and 
how it is used. 
x There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that was obtained for one 
purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his consent. 
x There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable information 
about him. 
x Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal 
data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take precaution to 
prevent misuse of the data.  
 
The HEW Report also raised concerns about the use of the Social Security number 
                                                 
14 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 
15 15 U.S.C. § 1681g. 
16 15 U.S.C. § 1681i. 
17 §1681m(a). 
18 §1681b(b). 
19 §1681b(b). 
20 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 
21 15 U.S.C. § 1681u. 
22  PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1995). 
23 U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated 
Personal Data Systems, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, (The HEW Report) (1973). 
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(SSN), which was fast becoming a “standard universal identifier” that would link all of the 
records kept on a person by all agencies. The HEW Report recommended that the use of SSNs 
should be strictly curbed.24  
The Privacy Act grew out of the HEW Report.  The Act requires government agencies to 
show an individual any records kept on him or her.25 It requires agencies to follow the Fair 
Information Practices when gathering and handling personal data.26  Agencies must provide 
people with access and correction rights; must limit data collection to only the information 
necessary to fulfill a specified government function; and must destroy data after a certain period 
of time. The Act places restrictions on how agencies can share an individual’s data with other 
people and agencies.27  Finally, the Act permits individuals to sue government agencies for 
violations.28The FCRA and Privacy Act have thus provided a basic framework of privacy 
protection, with the FCRA addressing the key private sector uses of personal data and the 
Privacy Act addressing public sector uses.   
 
C. The Database Industry 
 
A number of companies have arisen apart from the consumer reporting agencies or have 
spun off of the consumer reporting agencies.  These companies’ primary business is gathering, 
analyzing, and disseminating personal data.  One such company is ChoicePoint, Inc., based in 
Alpharetta, Georgia, which spun off from consumer reporting agency Equifax in 1997.29  
ChoicePoint sells information and data services to insurers, businesses, government agencies, 
and direct marketers.30  In 2004, the company reported total revenue of nearly one billion 
dollars.31  : 
In its short history, ChoicePoint has managed to attain a large share of the commercial 
data broker market with strategic purchases of other businesses.  In 2000, ChoicePoint purchased 
DBT Online, Inc., a successful commercial data broker that provides “AutoTrackXP,” a favored 
law enforcement-oriented service.32  In all, ChoicePoint has acquired over 50 database 
companies.33  Choicepoint has 100,000 clients, and sells services to 7,000 federal, state, and local 
law enforcement agencies.34 
ChoicePoint is only one of many similar types of companies.  Acxiom is “a billion-dollar 
player in the data industry, with details about nearly every adult in the United States.”35  Acxiom 
                                                 
24 Id. at XX. 
25 5 U.S.C. § 552a (d). 
26 5 U.S.C. § 552a (e).  See also Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What 
Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2001). 
27 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b). 
28 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g). 
29 Choicepoint, Form 10, Jun. 9, 1997, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1040596/0000950144-
97-006666.txt. 
30 See EPIC ChoicePoint Page, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/.   
31 Choicepoint, Form 10-k, Mar. 16, 2005, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1040596/000095014405002577/g93507e10vk.htm#102. 
32 ChoicePoint Corporation, SEC Form 10-K, Mar. 26, 2003. 
33 ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 130 (2005). 
34 After the Breach: How Secure and Accurate is Consumer Information Held by ChoicePoint and Other Data 
Aggregators?, Before the California Senate Banking Committee, Mar. 30, 2005 (testimony of Don McGuffey, Vice 
President, Data Strategy, Choicepoint). 
35 ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 34, 37-50 (2005). 
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provides information to marketers for profiling consumers, manages credit records, sells data for 
background checks, and provides data to government agencies: 
 
It’s not just names, ages, addresses, and telephone numbers.  The computers in [Acxiom’s] rooms 
also hold billions of records about marital status and families and ages of children.  They track 
individuals’ estimated incomes, the value of their homes, the make and price of their cars.  They 
maintain unlisted phone numbers and details about people’s occupations, religions, and 
ethnicities.  They sometimes know what some people read, what they order over the phone and 
online, and where they go on vacation. . . .36 
 
LexisNexis, a corporation owned by the UK-based Reed Elsevier, offers access to 
numerous databases and information retrieval services.37 Through services such as its featured 
search tool “SmartLinx,” LexisNexis offers access to social security numbers, addresses, 
licenses, real estate holdings, bankruptcies, liens, marital status, and other personal 
information.38     
ChoicePoint, Acxiom, and LexisNexis are three of the larger data brokers.  There are 
many other companies that comprise this industry.  The database industry provides data to 
companies for marketing, to the government for law enforcement purposes, to private 
investigators for investigating individuals, to creditors for credit checks, and to employers for 
background checks.   
The government has increasingly been contracting with data brokers.  For example, 
ChoicePoint has multi-million dollar contracts with at least 35 federal agencies, including the 
IRS and FBI.39  The United States Marshals Service uses Lexis-Nexis for “location of witnesses, 
suspects, informants, criminals, parolees in criminal investigations, location of witnesses, parties 
in civil actions.”40  Lexis-Nexis’ Person Tracker Plus Social Security number is a private library 
“designed to meet the needs of law enforcement.”41  It provides information probably derived 
from credit headers, including the name, SSN, current address, two prior addresses, aliases, 
birthdate, and telephone number.42  And after 9-11, Acxiom positioned itself as “an anti-
terrorism company” by actively pursuing ways to manage personal information for the 
government.43  Charles Morgan, Acxiom's CEO, stated after 9-11 that “we developed a sense 
among the leadership at Acxiom that for this country to be a safer place [the government] had to 
be able to work with information better.”44   
Increasingly, the government is becoming interested in data mining technologies.  Data 
mining involves searching through repositories of data to find out new information by combining 
existing pieces of data or to make predictions about future behavior based on patterns in the data.    
One of the government’s most notable attempts to engage in data mining research was the Total 
                                                 
36 Id. at 129-130, 132. 
37 LexisNexis, Company History, at http://www.lexis-nexis.com/presscenter/mediakit/history.asp (last visited Mar. 
27, 2004) 
38 LexisNexis, SmartLinx, at http://www.lexis-nexis.com/smartlinx/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) 
39 SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra, at 169.   
40 Exhibit B, Lexis-Nexis Select Limited Distribution Authorized Use List, Document Obtained from the United 
States Marshals Service, Undated, available at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02a.pdf.  
41 Lexis-Nexis Fax Bulletin, Document Obtained from the United States Marshals Service, Undated, available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02e.pdf. 
42 Id. 
43 O’HARROW, supra, at 60.  
44 Id. at 58.   
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Information Awareness program, run by John Poindexter in the Department of Defense, which 
received considerable media attention in late 2002.45  The idea was to gather various records 
about individuals from businesses and then analyze it for patterns of terrorist behavior.  Due to 
sharp criticism, the Senate denied funding to the program in 2003.46  However, the development 
of government data mining programs did not die with Total Information Awareness.  According 
to the Report of the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee (TAPAC), appointed by 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Total Information Awareness is “not unique in its 
potential for data mining.  TAPAC is aware of many other programs in use or under development 
both within DOD and elsewhere in the government that make similar uses of personal information 
concerning U.S. persons to detect and deter terrorist activities.”47    In light of the intense 
criticism that Total Information Awareness generated, government agencies have moved data 
mining projects underground.  Increasingly, such data analysis is being outsourced to database 
companies.  ChoicePoint vice president James Zimbardi declared: “We do act as an intelligence 
agency, gathering data, applying analytics.”48 
 
D. The Limits of U.S. Privacy Law 
 
The FCRA and the Privacy Act do not adequately address the activities of the database 
industry.  The FCRA applies to “any consumer reporting agency” that furnishes a “consumer 
report.”49  The definition of “consumer reporting agency” is any person who “regularly engages” 
in collecting information about consumers “for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to 
third parties.”50  This definition turns on the meaning of “consumer report,” which is the key 
term that defines the scope of the Act.  Unfortunately, the FCRA has a poorly drafted definition 
of “consumer report” that has allowed some to unduly narrow the Act’s coverage.  The Act 
conditions the definition of “consumer report” on how the information is used.  That is, a 
“consumer report” is any communication bearing on a consumer’s character or general 
reputation which is used for credit evaluation, employment screening, insurance underwriting, or 
licensing.51 Although the FCRA was passed to limit the uses of personal information in 
evaluating people, a literal reading of its definition of “consumer report” makes the law 
inapplicable if information is used for an unauthorized purpose beyond those enumerated in the 
Act.  One could argue, for instance, that a criminal using credit information for fraud has not 
triggered the FCRA because fraud is not an authorized use.  These problems in the definition of 
“consumer report” have allowed data brokers to avoid being regulated by the FCRA.  
The FBI uses similar reasoning to evade protections of the FCRA.  In a memo justifying 
the agency's reliance on services provided by commercial data broker ChociePoint, the agency 
reasoned: “In this instance, none of the information which the FBI would seek to review has 
been collected by ChoicePoint for any of the (FCRA) purposes.”52  The FBI further concludes 
                                                 
45 SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra at 168-69.  
46 Id. at 169.   
47 TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM 
vii-x, 45-49 (2004) 
48 Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Firm Quietly Finds Wealth in Information, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 2005, at A1. 
49 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 
50 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f).  
51 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (emphasis added).  For an account of other limitations of the FCRA, see Joel R. Reidenberg, 
Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. L.J. 195 (1992).  
52 Guidance Regarding the Use of ChoicePoint for Foreign Intelligence Collection or Foreign Counterterrorism 
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that ChoicePoint is not a consumer reporting agency: “[b]ecause ChoicePoint does not collect 
‘public record information’ for any of the highlighted purposes [under the FCRA], ChoicePoint 
is not acting as a ‘consumer reporting agency’ for the purposes of the FCRA and the collected 
information therefore does not constitute a ‘consumer report.’”53 
In the absence of statutory regulation, data brokers have adopted self-regulatory rules 
known as the Individual Reference Services Group (IRSG) Principles.54  The Principles set forth 
a weak framework of protections, allowing companies to sell non-public personal information 
“without restriction” to “qualified subscribers,” which includes law enforcement agencies.55  
“Qualified subscribers” need only state a valid purpose for obtaining the information and agree 
to limit redissemination of information.56  Under IRSG, individuals can only opt-out of the sale 
of personal information to the “general public,” but ChoicePoint does not consider its customers 
to be members of the general public.57  The IRSG Principles were carefully crafted in order to 
ensure maximum flexibility by commercial data brokers.  They have failed to set forth a 
reasonable degree of protection for individuals, and in fact, it was while data brokers were 
operating under these principles that the major privacy breaches occurred.   
The FCRA also fails to provide sufficient protection against identity theft, a crime that is 
rising at an alarming rate.  Identity theft involves the use of a victim’s personal information to 
improperly access accounts, obtain credit in the victim’s name, or otherwise engage in 
transactions by masquerading as the victim.  In 2003, the FTC estimated that “almost 10 million 
Americans have discovered that they were the victim of some form of ID Theft within the past 
year.”58  The FCRA, unfortunately, does little to prevent identity theft or to minimize its impact 
on victims once it occurs.  Under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 
2003, which amended FCRA, individuals can now obtain a free credit report once a year from 
each of the three major consumer reporting agencies (Equifax, Trans Union, and Experian).59  
And individuals can place a fraud “alert” on their records if they are victimized by identity theft, 
but such alert “is often as simple as a mere entry in the ‘100-word statement’ box in credit files 
                                                                                                                                                             
Investigations, Document Obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sept. 17, 2001, available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpfbia.pdf. 
53 Guidance Regarding the Use of ChoicePoint for Foreign Intelligence Collection or Foreign Counterterrorism 
Investigations, Document Obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sept. 17, 2001, available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpfbia.pdf.  A strong argument can be made that these interpretations are flawed.  
The provisions of FCRA governing law enforcement access make it clear that Congress intended procedural 
safeguards against disclosure of credit information, regardless of its intended use.  As Dempsey and Flint note in 
their review of federal privacy law and access to commercial information, some courts have ruled that when 
information is collected for consumer reporting purposes, it remains a consumer report, despite the fact that it may 
be employed for non-FCRA purposes.  JAMES DEMPSEY & LARA FLINT, PRIVACY’S GAP: THE LARGELY NON-
EXISTENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT MINING OF COMMERCIAL DATA Fn. 16, May 28, 2003, available 
at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030528cdt.pdf. 
54 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (Dec. 1997), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/wkshp97/irsdoc1.htm. 
55 INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES GROUP, IRSG PRINCIPLES, available at 
http://west.thomson.com/bottom/irsgprin.asp. 
56 Id. 
57 Letter from Gina Moore, ChoicePoint, to Chris Hoofnagle, Electronic Privacy Information Center, (Feb. 21, 2003) 
(emphasis in original) (on file with author). 
58 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 4, 6 (Sept. 2003).  For an excellent account of 
the rise of identity theft, see BOB SULLIVAN, YOUR EVIL TWIN: BEHIND THE IDENTITY THEFT EPIDEMIC (2004). 
59 15 U.S.C. § § 1681j.   
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that’s made available to consumers who disagree with an entry made in their credit file.”60  
Moreover, the alert does not stop activity in a person’s file.  Instead, it acts as a warning to a 
retailer that they should exercise more care in credit granting.  A savvy identity thief could 
continue with more fraud even with the alert present.  
The Privacy Act also suffers from many problems that limit its effectiveness.  It only 
applies to the federal government and to private companies that are administering a system of 
records for the government.61  Thus, when the information originates from the government and is 
transferred to a private company, then Privacy Act requirements apply to the contractor.62   
However, a database of information that originates at a data broker would not trigger the 
requirements of the Privacy Act.  And beyond data brokers, consumer reporting agencies are 
specifically exempted from being considered a federal contractor for systems of records.63 
This limitation to the Privacy Act is critical—it allows data brokers to amass huge 
databases that the government is legally prohibited from creating.  Then, when the government 
needs the information, it can request it from the data broker.  At that point, the personal 
information would be subject to the Privacy Act, but law enforcement and intelligence agencies 
have special exemptions under the Act that limit access, accuracy, and correction rights.64  For 
example, law enforcement agencies “may promulgate rules . . . to exempt any system of records 
[involving information about criminal investigation or criminal history] within the agency from 
any part of [the Privacy Act].”65  
The Privacy Act’s attempt to rein in the use of SSNs has been a failure.  One of the 
primary reasons is that the Act fails to restrict the use of SSNs by businesses or other private 
sector entities.  Such a restriction was proposed during the creation of the Privacy Act, but 
Congress failed to include it in the Act.66  Today, SSNs are routinely used by businesses and 
other entities, often as a password to gain access to accounts. 
Another limitation is that the Privacy Act only applies to federal, not state or local 
government agencies.  Moreover, the Act has a number of major exceptions, including one that 
exempts agencies when they disclose information for “any routine use” that is “compatible” with 
the purpose for which the agency gathered the data.67  As Robert Gellman has observed: “This 
vague formula has not created much of a substantive barrier to external disclosure of personal 
information. . . . Later legislation, political pressures, and bureaucratic convenience tended to 
overwhelm the law’s weak limitations.”68 
In sum, the database industry is increasingly straining the regulatory regime for 
information privacy established in the early 1970s.  The existing regime has struggled to address 
the rise of new data-trafficking companies apart from consumer reporting agencies, the 
burgeoning cooperation of businesses with the government for intelligence and law enforcement 
                                                 
60 SULLIVAN, EVIL TWIN, supra, at 85. 
61 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m). 
62 Modification M001, Document Obtained from the United States Marshals Service, Undated, available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpusms7.30.02d.pdf 
63 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m)(2). 
64 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k). 
65 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j). 
66 ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEBSITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE 
INTERNET 297 (2000). 
67 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).   
68 Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE (Philip E. Agre 
& Marc Rotenberg eds. 1997).  
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operations, and the wide range and extent to which personal data is currently being used.  While 
privacy laws passed after the 1970s apply to specific kinds of records such as video rental 
records and cable television records, most of these laws fail to cover the database industry.69  The 
Model Regime we propose in the pages that follow is designed to address the gaps and 
limitations in existing law.   
 
II. THE MODEL REGIME 
 
A. Notice, Consent, Control, and Access 
1. Universal Notice 
 
(a) Problem 
 
There is no general knowledge about the companies using personal information.  In order to 
grant consent, gain access, or otherwise exercise one’s rights with regard to personal information 
maintained by data brokers, consumer reporting agencies, and other institutions, people must 
know about what institutions are collecting their data.  Providing such rights without knowledge 
of the companies will be meaningless.  For example, in the ChoicePoint security scandal, most 
people had no idea that ChoicePoint existed, let alone that it was collecting and selling their 
personal data.  Moreover, as the ChoicePoint security scandal demonstrates, data brokers 
routinely sell personal information with little oversight about who may receive the data and how 
it will be used.  The problems of such a system were emphatically illustrated in Remsburg v. 
Docusearch,70 where a data broker was employed by a stalker to locate and murder Amy Boyer.  
ChoicePoint has repeatedly invited a national debate and discussion about data brokers, but such 
a discussion cannot meaningfully take place unless people are informed about what information 
data brokers have and what they do with that information. 
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
To ensure meaningful access, opt-out, and other rights, there must be a way to provide people 
with notice about all of the companies collecting their information.   
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
Any company primarily engaged in interstate collection, maintenance, and/or sale of personally 
identifiable information shall register with the FTC.  Such registration shall include the nature of 
personal information collected, the name and contact information for the data controller, as well 
as a clear and concrete description of the uses to which the information is put.  Data brokers shall 
also disclose the types of businesses and entities to whom they disclose personal information as 
well as what safeguards they have in place for vetting those entities that receive the data. This 
                                                 
69 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (cable records); Video Privacy Protection Act of 
1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (video records); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 , 15 U.S.C. §§ 
6501 et seq. (Internet websites gathering data about children under 13).   
70 149 N.H. 148 (2003). 
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information shall be publicly disclosed by the FTC on a website and in printed materials 
 
2. Meaningful Informed Consent 
 
(a) Problem 
 
Many data transfers and uses by companies occur without the meaningful informed consent of 
consumers.  The current regime of allowing consumers to opt-out of data sharing, as embodied in 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, is ineffective.  The incentives are such that companies benefit if 
they make opting out as cumbersome as possible and do not adequately inform people about the 
uses of their data.  As a result, very few people opt-out, and those who try find the process 
difficult and time-consuming.  There are, of course, many uses of information that people would 
readily agree to.  However, people are often provided an all-or-nothing choice – surrender total 
control of information or be denied useful services or uses of information that they desire. 
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
There must be a way to ensure that consumers can exercise meaningful informed consent about 
the uses and dissemination of their personal information. 
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
Companies that collect personal information should be required to first obtain an individual’s 
consent before using it for an unrelated secondary use, except for reasonable investigation of 
fraud.  To the extent that companies endeavor to use personal information for secondary uses 
without first obtaining individual consent, such uses shall be specifically authorized by statute or 
regulation.  For all new uses of personal information, companies must either be authorized by 
statute to engage in such a use or seek the consent of the individuals to whom the information 
pertains.  When a company engages in any new use authorized by statute, it shall disclose such 
expansion in use immediately to the FTC and the change shall be displayed clearly on the FTC 
website so that individuals are aware of the change.   
 
3. One-Step Exercise of Rights 
 
(a) Problem 
 
There are hundreds, possibly thousands, of companies that collect and trade in personal 
information.  To the extent that the law provides people with rights of access, opt-in, opt-out, 
limitation of use and transfer, and so on, these rights must currently be exercised one-at-a-time at 
each individual company.  For example, under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, people have a right 
to opt-out of the transfer of their data to third parties for marketing purposes.  Many people have 
dealings with a multitude of financial institutions, and opting out of each one can be onerous and 
time-consuming.  When data brokers are brought into the fold, this will make such exercise of 
rights exponentially more difficult.  Imagine the time it would take to opt-out with hundreds of 
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different companies.  And this example merely involves opt-out.  There are many other rights 
that people exercise as well, and exercising all with the multitude of companies individually will 
prove nearly impossible and time-prohibitive.   
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
To ensure the meaningful exercise of rights with regard to personal information, there must be a 
way to exercise these rights in an efficient and easy manner that is centralized.   
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
In conjunction with the universal notice, the FTC shall develop a centralized mechanism for 
people to exercise their rights with respect to their personal information.  Such a mechanism 
would mimic the Do Not Call website, which allows individuals to opt-out of telemarketing and 
verify their enrollment by visiting a single website.  Similarly, individuals should be able to 
enroll in a centralized do-not-share registry.  Other rights, to address security risks, including 
access and correction, will have to be administered by the individual companies maintaining 
personal data.  The centralized mechanism will simply provide a pointer to instructions on how 
to exercise these rights with the companies maintaining data. 
 
Those seeking to access any personal information collected on the centralized mechanism for 
purposes other than those for which the mechanism was created must first obtain a court order.  
Only specifically-enumerated approved purposes will be authorized.  As for law enforcement 
access to the data, officials will have to demonstrate probable cause and obtain only so much 
information as necessary to meet the needs articulated in the showing of probable cause. 
 
4. Individual Credit Management 
 
(a) Problem 
 
As the ChoicePoint snafu illustrates, individuals are not in control of the basic information that is 
used for credit identification authentication.   Numerous individuals and companies can access 
people’s credit information without that person’s knowledge.  Identity thieves take advantage of 
this system, as they can seek loans or credit cards with creditors, who will check the victim’s 
credit without informing the victim.  Such credit checks are often the beginning steps in an 
identity theft.  Because these checks can occur without the victim’s knowledge or consent, the 
identity thief can readily obtain credit in the victim’s name surreptitiously.  Many identity thefts 
would be stopped at their incipiency if only the victim had known about the access to the 
victim’s credit records and could have blocked such access.  Moreover, the problem exacerbates 
identity thefts after they are underway because victims are unaware that they have been 
victimized until months or years later.   
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(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
To ensure effective individual management of consumer reporting, there must be a way for 
individuals to have knowledge when entities attempt to access their credit records and have the 
ability to block such access. 
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
First, notice shall be issued whenever any new person or entity makes an inquiry on or accesses 
the consumer report of another.  The individual can choose to receive such notice by mail, 
telephone, or email.  Second, unless individuals choose otherwise, credit records shall be 
“frozen,” whereupon they can only be accessed by others after the individual has preapproved 
the release of such records.  Third, to guarantee maximum possible accuracy of consumer 
reports, individuals should be entitled to free credit monitoring if they choose. 
 
5. Access to and Accuracy of Personal Information 
 
(a) Problem 
 
ChoicePoint and other data brokers collect detailed dossiers of personal information on 
practically every American citizen.  Most people haven’t even heard of these companies.  Even if 
they do know about these companies, people have no way of knowing what information is 
maintained about them, why it is being kept, how long it is being maintained, to whom it is being 
disseminated, and how it is being used.   The records maintained by these companies can have 
inaccuracies.  This wouldn’t matter much if the information were never used for anything 
important.  But the data is being used in ways that directly affect individuals – by the 
government for law enforcement purposes and private investigators for investigation.   
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
There must be a way for individuals to ensure that their personal information maintained by 
various data brokers is maintained accurately and that it is not kept for an unreasonable amount 
of time.   
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
Individuals shall, in a centralized manner, be able to access their information and an accounting 
of disclosures from data brokers at no cost.  Data brokers must limit the amount of time they 
maintain personal information to a reasonable period.  As with consumer reporting agencies 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a procedure shall be developed for individuals to correct 
inaccuracies in their records.    
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B. Security of Personal Information 
 
6. Secure Identification 
 
(a) Problem 
 
Businesses and financial institutions currently grant access to people’s records when the accessor 
merely supplies a Social Security Number, date of birth, mother’s maiden name, or other forms 
of personal information that is either available in public records or sold by data brokers.  This 
makes the repositories of individuals’ personal data and their accounts woefully insecure, as 
identity thieves can readily obtain the information needed to gain access and usurp control.  As 
the ChoicePoint security scandal illustrates, Social Security Numbers and other personal 
information about hundreds of thousands of people can readily fall into the hands of identity 
thieves.  
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
There must be a way to prevent readily available pieces of personal information from being used 
as passwords to gain access to people’s records and accounts.   
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
Companies shall develop methods of identification which (1) are not based on publicly available 
personal information or data that can readily be purchased from a data broker; and (2) can be 
easily changed if they fall into the wrong hands.  Whereas Social Security Numbers cannot be 
changed without significant hassle, and dates of birth and mother’s maiden names cannot be 
changed, identifiers such as passwords can be changed with ease.  Furthermore, they are not 
universal, and thus a thief with a password cannot access all of a victim’s accounts – only those 
with that password.  Biometric identifiers present problems because they are impossible to 
change, and if they fall into the wrong hands could prove devastating for victims as well as 
present ongoing risks to national security.  Therefore, passwords are a cheap and effective way to 
limit much identity theft and minimize the problems victims face in clearing up the damage 
caused by identity theft.    
 
7. Disclosure of Security Breaches 
 
(a) Problem 
 
When companies suffer security breaches that result in personal information being leaked or 
falling into the hands of unauthorized third parties, the people to whom the personal information 
pertains are made more vulnerable to fraud and identity theft.  They often are not aware of this, 
and are unable to take steps to protect themselves such as monitoring their consumer reports.  
This was dramatically illustrated by the ChoicePoint security breach, which apparently was the 
second time where the company had sold personal information to criminals.  The first incident 
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occurred in 2002 and only recently came to public light in the context of the second breach, 
which had to be disclosed under California’s information security breach disclosure 
requirements.  ChoicePoint is not the only commercial data broker that has disclosed records to 
others improperly—in 2002 and 2003 two individuals were able to crack commercial data broker 
Acxiom’s databases, leading to the release of 20 million names and Social Security Numbers.71 
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
There must be a way for individuals to learn about security breaches that result in the leakage or 
improper access of their personal data. 
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
Companies shall be placed under an affirmative obligation to provide direct notice to the 
individuals whose data has been leaked or improperly accessed.  Such a statute could be modeled 
on California’s information security breach law.72  Individuals should also receive a copy of the 
dossier or information given to the unauthorized party. 
 
C. Business Access to and Use of Personal Information 
 
8. Social Security Number Use Limitation 
 
(a) Problem 
 
Numerous businesses and organizations demand that a person provide a Social Security Number 
and then use that number as a password for access to accounts and data.  Many schools and other 
organizations use Social Security Numbers on identification cards, thus ensuring that when a 
wallet is lost or stolen, one’s Social Security Number is exposed.  The use of Social Security 
Numbers is so extensive that as simple a transaction as signing up for cell phone service often 
requires disclosing one’s Social Security Number. 
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
There must be a way to reduce the use of Social Security Numbers by private sector businesses. 
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
Unless specifically authorized by statute or regulation, business and other privacy sector entities 
shall be barred from using Social Security Numbers for identification purposes.  A useful starting 
point is the framework of protections for the Social Security Number embodied in California 
law, which provides a panoply of protections for the identifier, including prohibitions on the 
publication of the SSN, the embedding of a SSN in an identification document, and limits the 
                                                 
71 ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 71-72 (2005). 
72 Cal. Civil Code § 1798.29. 
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appearance of the identifier in family court records.73 
 
9. Access and Use Restrictions for Public Records 
 
(a) Problem 
 
Public records were once scattered about the country, and finding out information on individuals 
involved trekking to or calling a series of different local offices.  Today, massive database 
companies sweep up the data in public record systems and use it to construct dossiers on 
individuals for marketers, private investigators, and the government.  This is what ChoicePoint 
does.  These uses of public records turn the justification for public records on its head.  Public 
records are essential for effective oversight of government activities, but commercial data 
brokers have perverted this principled purpose, and now public records have become a tool of 
businesses and the government to watch individuals.   
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
There must be a way to regulate access and uses of public records that maximizes exposure of 
government activities and minimizes the disclosure of personal information about individuals.    
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
Access to personal information in public records shall be restricted for certain purposes.  For 
example, accessing public records to obtain data for commercial solicitation should be 
prohibited.  Other purposes shall be permitted: monitoring the government, research, educational 
purposes, tracing property ownership, and other traditional non-commercial purposes.  Data 
brokers obtaining such data should be required to promise via contract, in return for receiving 
such data, to be subject to reasonable use restrictions on that data and to demand that those to 
whom the data is transferred also restrict uses and transfers.  Such regulation would have allowed 
for greater control over ChoicePoint’s use of personal data, since it obtained a significant amount 
of its information from public records.  Additionally, federal, state, and local agencies that 
maintain public record systems must make substantial efforts to limit the disclosure of Social 
Security Numbers, phone numbers, addresses, and dates of birth.  
 
10. Curbing Excessive Uses of Background Checks 
 
(a) Problem 
 
Background checks are cheaper now than ever before, leading to a situation where individuals 
are being screened for even menial jobs.  We risk altering our society to one where the individual 
can never escape a youthful indiscretion or a years-old arrest, even for a minor infraction.  Pre-
employment screens are frequently being used by employers even for jobs that do not involve 
                                                 
73 Cal. Civil Code §§ 1798.85-1798.86, 1785.11.1, 1785.11.6 and 1786.60; Cal. Family Code § 2024.5. 
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security-related functions, the handling of large sums of money, or the supervision of children or 
the elderly.   
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
There must be a way to limit the use of background checks to those jobs where there is a 
reasonable and justifiable need.   
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
Background checks should only be performed in contexts where fiduciary relationships are 
involved, where a large amount of money is handled, where employment involves care taking, or 
any of the jobs enumerated by the Employee Privacy Protection Act.74  Whether background 
checks are performed by employers or by companies hired to do the screening, the employee or 
prospective employee shall receive a copy of the actual investigation. 
 
11. Private Investigators  
 
(a) Problem 
 
Private investigators routinely access personal information about individuals from data brokers.  
Private investigators often operate without the extensive regulation that public law enforcement 
officials must heed.  In some states, they are not subject to licensure; in others they are subject 
only to a pro forma process.  As a result, they can be a source of great abuses.  The Rebecca 
Schaeffer incident that sparked the passage of the Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act demonstrates 
the problem.  A private investigator obtained actress Rebecca Schaeffer’s home address from a 
state DMV office.  The investigator was working for a stalker who used the information to go to 
Schaeffer’s home and murder her.75  More recently, Amy Boyer was murdered by a stalker who 
had hired private investigators to locate her.76   
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
There must be a system that ensures greater accountability in the private investigator profession. 
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
Each state should be required to establish minimum standards for licensure and oversight of the 
private investigator industry.  Such standards should address the use of pretexting (pretending to 
be another person in order to gain access to someone’s account or to gain information), establish 
a duty of care to those who are investigated, and prohibit the use of invasive practices, such as 
sorting through individuals’ trash, employing electronic listening devices, etc. 
 
                                                 
74 29 U.S.C. § 2006 (listing jobs involving national defense and security). 
75 See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1137, 1191 (2002). 
76 See Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148 (2003). 
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D. Government Access to and Use of Personal Data 
 
12. Limiting Government Access to Business and Financial Records 
 
(a) Problem 
 
Increasingly, the government is gathering personal information from businesses and financial 
institutions.  Companies such as ChoicePoint have multi-million dollar contracts with 
government agencies to supply them with personal information.  The Fourth Amendment is often 
inapplicable because in a series of cases, including United States v. Miller77 and Smith v. 
Maryland,78 the Court has held that whenever a third party possesses personal information, there 
is no reasonable expectation of privacy.  In the Information Age, it is impossible to live without 
extensive information about one’s life existing in the hands of various third parties: phone 
companies, cable companies, Internet Service Providers, merchants, booksellers, employers, 
landlords, and so on.  Thus, the government can increasingly obtain detailed information about a 
person without ever entering her home 
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
There must be a way to engage in electronic commerce and routine transactions without losing 
one’s expectation of privacy in personal data. 
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
Whenever the government attempts to access personal information from third parties that 
maintain record systems of personal information (databases or other records of personally 
identifiable information on more than one individual), the government should be required to 
obtain a special court order that requires probable cause and particularized suspicion that the 
information sought involves evidence of a crime.  Exceptions should exist for reasonable law 
enforcement needs, including emergency circumstances. 
13. Government Data Mining 
 
(a) Problem 
 
The government is increasingly researching, planning, and initiating data mining endeavors.  
Data mining entails combining and analyzing various records of personal information for 
suspicious patterns of behavior.  This was envisioned on a grand scale with the Total Information 
Awareness project.  Due to a public outcry, Congress nixed the program from the public budget.  
But a recent GAO report as well as the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee report 
demonstrates that a number of government data mining programs are underway.79  Data mining 
                                                 
77 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
78 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
79 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES  2-3 
(May 2004). 
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threatens to undermine a longstanding Fourth Amendment principle, which holds that dragnet 
searches – those without prior particularized suspicion – are impermissible.  Because there are 
serious inaccuracies in dossiers created by commercial data brokers, innocent people may be 
swept into these dragnets.  Furthermore, the profiles and algorithms used to determine suspicious 
patterns of behavior are often kept secret, thus impeding public accountability or judicial 
oversight, and providing no way to find out the extent of use of certain factors such as race, 
religion, and First Amendment activity.   
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
There must be a way to ensure that government data mining does not permit law enforcement to 
engage in dragnet searches for prospective crimes.  Where data mining is employed, it should 
occur in as open a way as possible with adequate judicial oversight and public accountability. 
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
Subject to judicial oversight and normal search warrant requirements, prospective subject-based 
data mining should be permitted.  Subject-based data mining involves analyzing records where a 
specific individual or individuals are identified and where there is particularized suspicion that 
they are involved in criminal activity.  Pattern-based data mining presents greater difficulties.  
Prospective pattern-based data mining involves analyzing record systems for various suspicious 
patterns of activity and then investigating those individuals who meet the particular pattern or 
profile.  Pattern-based data mining should be generally prohibited, as it involves a dragnet 
search.  However, with appropriate judicial supervision and with a way to preserve the principle 
of particularized suspicion, pattern-based data mining should be permitted in cases where there 
are specific and articulable facts that a particular crime will or has occurred, that a particular 
limited type of record system (not a broad dossier) has information that is necessary to the 
investigation (no alternatives available), and where the inquiry into the record system is limited.   
Data mining profiles must be approved by a court prior to use and must be revealed to the public 
once the investigation is over.  Moreover, as is currently done with wiretapping, government 
agencies engaging in data mining shall produce annual public reports to Congress describing the 
frequency and nature of their data mining activities. 
14. Control of Government Maintenance of Personal Information 
 
(a) Problem 
 
The Privacy Act of 1974 is riddled with loopholes.  Despite a requirement that government 
agencies disclose new record systems, they can readily avert other substantive requirements 
simply by declaring that they want to exempt these records.   For instance, in 2003, the Justice 
Department administratively discharged the FBI of its statutory duty to ensure the accuracy and 
completeness of the over 39 million criminal records it maintains in its National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC) database.80  That database provides over 80,000 law enforcement 
agencies with access to data on wanted persons, missing persons, gang members, as well as 
information about stolen cars, boats, and other information.  Aside from agencies exempting 
                                                 
80 Exemption of Federal Bureau of Investigation Systems--Limited Access, 28 C.F.R. 16.96 (2004). 
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themselves from the requirements of the act, agencies have also employed the “routine use” 
exemption in such a broad fashion that it contravenes the intent of the Privacy Act.  Another 
limitation of the Privacy Act is that it is very difficult for plaintiffs to obtain remedies.  Plaintiffs 
must prove a “willful or intentional” violation of the Act, which is difficult since many agency 
actions are negligent or reckless.  Moreover, in Doe v. Chao,81 the Court held that plaintiffs suing 
for violations of the Privacy Act must prove actual loss in order to obtain minimum damages of 
$1000 under the Act.   Although many plaintiffs whose personal information is leaked by an 
agency suffer emotional distress, for many courts such emotional distress is not sufficient to 
constitute an actual loss.  Accordingly, such plaintiffs are left without a remedy.        
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
There must be meaningful regulation limiting the collection of personal data, acceptable uses, 
accuracy, security, and retention of personal information by government agencies, especially 
since they are acquiring more and more data about individuals. 
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
The Privacy Act must be updated.  Over thirty years have gone by without a major re-
examination of the Privacy Act, and one is sorely needed.  Congress should empanel a new 
Privacy Protection Study Committee to examine government use of personal information 
comprehensively and make recommendations for legislation to update the Privacy Act.  Specific 
changes shall include, but shall not be limited to: (1) limiting the routine use exception; (2) 
addressing the outsourcing of personal information processing to private sector businesses; (3) 
strengthening the enforcement provisions of the Act; and (4) overturning Doe v. Chao.82 so that 
violations of the Act are remedied by minimum damages provisions.   
 
E. Privacy Innovation and Enforcement 
 
15. Preserving the Innovative Role of the States 
 
(a) Problem 
 
The recently enacted amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempted more protective 
state laws.  As a result, states are less able to pass effective identity theft and privacy protections. 
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
The ability of states to innovate new approaches to privacy protections must be preserved. 
 
                                                 
81 124 S. Ct. 1204 (2004). 
82 124 S. Ct. 1204 (2004). 
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(c) Specific Solution 
 
Most privacy protections in America have been created by state legislatures.  The security breach 
law that resulted in ChoicePoint disclosing the recent sale of personal information to criminals 
was developed in California.  Many of the most important protections in the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act originated in the states.  Indeed, as Justice Brandeis once noted: “It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country.”83  Legislation crafted to address privacy problems should only employ “floor 
preemption,” thereby allowing states to innovate more comprehensive protections for individual 
rights. 
 
16. Effective Enforcement of Privacy Rights 
 
(a) Problem 
 
Often, privacy rights are difficult to enforce. In many instances, it is difficult for victims to 
establish damages or causation when leaks or improper uses of their personal information result 
in identity theft or other harms.  When a company discloses a person’s data or violates its privacy 
policy by wrongfully transferring data to other companies or not providing adequate security, it 
is often difficult to prove actual damages.  As a result, companies often lack sufficient 
accountability and sanctions when they engage in wrongdoing.  About half of identity theft 
victims cannot tell how their personal information was even accessed, and thus do not know 
what parties should be pursued legally.  Moreover, it is very difficult for identity theft victims to 
prove actual monetary damages even though they have spent considerable time fixing the harm 
and suffered great mental distress.  With the ChoicePoint security debacle, people’s personal 
information was sold to identity thieves.  Although many did not suffer from identity theft, they 
still suffered harm, as they are now much more vulnerable to identity theft, have considerable 
mental unease, and must spend significantly more time monitoring their credit and accounts over 
a period that could last years.  
 
(b) Legislative Mandate 
 
There must be a way to ensure that privacy protections are enforced with meaningful sanctions 
as well as provide meaningful redress to victims.  
 
(c) Specific Solution 
 
There should be minimum liquidated damages provisions for companies that violate their privacy 
policies or that suffer a security breach due to negligence.  Statutes must provide for individual 
redress.  As part of an enforcement effort, individuals should be able to obtain an order to have a 
commercial data broker audited. In the event of leaked information, the most effective way to 
address the problem in a way that avoids extensive class action litigation is to authorize state 
attorneys general to fine companies and establish a fund where victims can make claims for 
                                                 
83 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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disbursements.   
 
III. COMMENTARY 
 
Version 1.1 of the Model Regime, which we released on March 10, 2005, received 
considerable attention.  It has been discussed in testimony at legislatures at the federal and state 
level.  We received a number of very thoughtful comments and read many insightful discussions 
across the blogosphere.84.  The comments we received range from being very supportive of the 
Model Regime to being very critical.  In this section, we respond to some of the comments and 
criticisms to the Model Regime. This section will continue to be developed in subsequent 
versions as we receive comments and feedback.   
 
A. General Comments 
 
 
Eric Goldman, Assistant Professor at Marquette University School of Law, comments 
that the Model Regime has no cost/benefit analysis.  He contends that “investments in increased 
privacy are like investments in security—they may end up being infrastructural investments that 
ultimately prove to be ‘wasted’ investments in terms of social welfare they create.”85  Many of 
the solutions proposed are not very costly.  With respect to those that do impose costs on 
business, it must be noted that identity theft costs businesses tens billions of dollars a year.86  If 
the solutions have just a moderate effect on identity theft, they could pay for themselves.   
Additionally, the business community has been loathe to recognize the costs of a lack of 
privacy to individuals, which includes lost time, frustration with direct marketing, and sometimes 
increased vulnerability to violent crime.  For instance, an anonymous commentator who works in 
the credit industry wrote to us that “since federal law right now does not hold them [identity theft 
victims] liable for fraud accounts or the misuse of their accounts, there really is no harm you are 
protecting against. . . .”87  In contrast, we believe that identity theft causes significant harm to 
individuals.  According to estimates, victims spend on average 200 hours and thousands of 
dollars fixing the damage.88  The harm is not simply measured in lost dollars; identity theft 
causes incalculable mental distress.  Victims feel helpless, and the ongoing nature of identity 
theft exacerbates these feelings.  Most other crimes have an ending point, in which victims can 
recover and begin to cope.  Identity theft can last for years, even after detection, thus creating a 
perpetual sense of victimization that has no apparent ending.  Moreover, victims are often 
financially crippled, and they can no longer engage in many financial transactions freely (such as 
obtaining loans, mortgages, etc.) until the damage to their credit is fixed.  We can find little 
evidence that these costs to the consumer have been adequately taken into account by businesses.  
                                                 
84 Jim Horning, Chief Scientist at McAfee Research (title listed for identification purposes only) and Rich Kulawiec 
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85 Email from Eric Goldman, Assistant Professor, Marquette university School of Law, Mar. 15, 2005 (on file with 
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IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 6 (Sept. 2003). 
87 Email from Anonymous, Apr. 4, 2005 (on file with authors). 
88 Janine Benner, Beth Givens, & Ed Mierzwinski, Nowhere To Turn: Victims Speak Out on Identity Theft: A 
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The Model Regime aims to force businesses to internalize some of the costs they impose on 
consumers.  To this extent, it increases costs on businesses, but such increases are justified.   
“Roy Owens” comments on Bruce Schneier’s blog that defamation laws could address 
inaccurate information flows.89  Defamation actions are costly to bring, and damages might be 
hard to prove.  In egregious cases where errors result in denial of loans or wrongful arrest, 
plaintiffs might have a powerful case, but defamation law will not provide adequate incentives to 
protect against many of the smaller errors that often crop up in databases.  These errors can cause 
harm, but not enough to support an expensive lawsuit.  We also note that under theFCRA, 
consumer reporting agencies are shielded from defamation prosecution, except in cases where 
there was malice or willful behavior.90  This legislative bargain gives the consumer reporting 
agencies flexibility to collect and report information as long as they use procedures to ensure 
“maximum possible accuracy.” 
Eric Grimm, an attorney with Calligaro & Meyering, P.C., and others suggest that any 
regulatory regime would be compromised by the fact that agencies may be captured by the 
companies that they regulate.91  We do not disagree, but we do not believe that this is a reason to 
reject regulatory solutions.  Agency capture is a risk with any regulatory action.  Despite agency 
capture problems, few would argue that we are better off without regulatory regimes for food, 
drugs, the environment, auto safety, and the like. Moreover, the risk of agency capture is 
mitigated when state attorneys general can prosecute wrongdoing, where individuals have a 
private right of action, and where federal regulation is a floor and thus allows states to create 
broader protections.  All of these are central features of our Model Regime. 
Matthew Miller, an attorney at Hughes & Luce LLP, blogging on Privacy Spot, praises 
the Model Regime.92  Miller suggests that the Model Regime address how long should data 
should be retained by entities.  Jim Horning also makes a similar suggestion.  Many privacy laws 
set an upward limit on the amount of time private entities can store personal information, 
including the Cable Communications Policy Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, and the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act.93  We have incorporated this suggestion into the Model Regime.   
Dennis Bailey, author of the book The Open Society Paradox, argues that “the free flow 
of data provides significant economic and social benefits and regulations that attempt to restrict it 
only serve to hurt the economy.”94 We agree that the collection and use of personal information 
can provide substantial benefits, but we disagree that any regulation of the free flow of data will 
necessarily impede economic development.  We live in a highly regulated society.  At the time of 
the New Deal, similar arguments were made in support of laissez faire.  Indeed, one response to 
the problems of the Industrial Age (pollution, poor worker conditions, etc.) was that any 
regulation would injure economic development.  Regulation is not necessarily in tension with 
                                                 
89 Comments to Bruce Schneier, Ideas for Privacy Reform, 
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90 15 U.S.C. § 1681h (e). 
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economic development, and many regulations benefit the economy and support innovation where 
there have been market failures.  
Moreover, the free flow of information and maximizing economic development are not 
the only normative ends of our society.  Information regulation can serve to promote fairness or 
prevent a panoply of types of discrimination.   For example, since the 1970s, it has been illegal 
under federal anti-discrimination laws to exclusively rely upon an arrest record to make hiring 
decisions, as minorities are more heavily targeted by law enforcement: “Blacks and Hispanics 
are convicted in numbers which are disproportionate to Whites and . . . barring people from 
employment based on their conviction records will therefore disproportionately exclude those 
groups.  Due to this adverse impact, an employer may not base an employment decision on the 
conviction record of an applicant or an employee absent business necessity.”95   
Dennis Bailey suggests in his blog that personal information should generally be public, 
and that regulation should only focus on the harmful uses of personal information: “If 
information is being used to deprive someone of their freedoms, such as the right to vote or the 
ability to get a job; or used to defraud someone through identity theft then the full weight of the 
law should be applied.  But to regulate data simply on the basis of privacy is not something I 
support.”96  It is not practical to take such an approach.  Limiting the public disclosure of certain 
data as a precaution is a first line of defense for individuals such as judges, workers at medical 
clinics performing abortions, and domestic violence victims.  The use of criminal law alone to 
address identity theft has been a failure.  Gartner, Inc., a research firm, estimates that far less 
than 1% of identity thefts result in a conviction.97   A U.S. General Accounting Office Report 
describes in compelling detail the difficulties with criminal investigation and prosecution of 
identity theft cases.98    
Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies at the Cato Institute comments that 
regulation “at its best proscribes a set of actions in order to prevent harm,” and criticizes 
regulations that seek to prevent behavior not tied to “monetary loss, property loss, or mental 
distress that causes physical symptoms, loss of work, or destruction of family and professional 
relationships.”99  Harper contends that common law torts could address the problems much more 
effectively than our Model Regime of regulatory provisions.    
The problem with applying common law torts is that data privacy harms are often ill-
defined and under-developed in the common law.  To what extent is an individual harmed if an 
intruder enters her home, looks through her papers, but doesn’t steal anything and leaves without 
a trace?  To what extent is an individual harmed whose personal data is leaked by a company 
such as ChoicePoint but who thus far has not been victimized in an identity theft?  Perhaps the 
common law could better address data privacy if it were to come to a different conception of 
harm.  As Warren and Brandeis noted in their seminal article on privacy, the law evolved to 
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address more than just property loss and physical harm.100  After the Warren and Brandeis 
article, the law developed to recognize the more incorporeal and emotional harms associated 
with privacy violations.101  But the common law has a long way to develop.  It must recognize 
duties on the part of data brokers such as ChoicePoint.  It must address issues of causation, as it 
is often impossible for victims to prove how their identity was stolen and which companies were 
responsible for the identity thief’s obtaining the victim’s personal data.  And it must develop a 
concept of harm that does not depend upon severe emotional distress, reputational harm, or 
actual monetary loss, as such harms are very difficult to prove when people’s data is merely 
leaked, when people are denied access to their information, or when people’s information is 
improperly transferred to other entities.  Common law torts can certainly supplement a regulatory 
regime, but they cannot serve as an adequate replacement for it without significant development.    
Michael Sankey, CEO of BRB Publications, a company that monitors government record 
access policies, made significant comments on the Model Regime.102  Sankey notes that the 
Model Regime “would be more useful if it recognized the existence of different vendors and 
what they do, rather than to primarily lump them together as ‘data brokers.’”  Sankey describes 
five general categories of public record vendors: “proprietary database vendors,” companies that 
“combine public sources of bulk data and/or online access to develop their own database 
product(s)” and “purchase or license records from other information vendors.”  “Gateways” are 
companies that “provide automated electronic gateway to Proprietary Database Vendors or to 
government agencies online systems.”  “Search firms” are companies that “furnish public record 
search and document retrieval services using online services and/or through a network of 
specialists, including their own employees or correspondents.”  “Verification firms” are 
companies that ensure information provided to employers and businesses is correct.  “Private 
investigation firms” are companies that “use public records as tools rather than as ends in 
themselves, in order to create an overall, comprehensive ‘picture’ of an individual or company 
for a particular purpose.”  These distinctions are informative, and should be considered when 
legislative packages are introduced to address the field of commercial data brokers.  We also 
note that in some cases, commercial data brokers perform many of the different functions 
described by Sankey.  
Although commercial data broker ChoicePoint did not comment on the Model Regime, 
the company did announce a series of changes to its business model in March 2005.  ChoicePoint 
stated that it “will discontinue the sale of information products that contain sensitive consumer 
data, including Social Security and driver’s license numbers, except where there is a specific 
consumer-driven transaction or benefit, or where the products support federal, state or local 
government and criminal justice purposes.”103  The company also has created “an independent 
office of Credentialing, Compliance and Privacy that will . . . oversee improvements in customer 
credentialing processes, the expansion of a site visit-based verification program and 
implementation of procedures to expedite the reporting of incidents.”104 
We think ChoicePoint’s reforms are inadequate to address the privacy implications of the 
commercial data broker industry.  First, ChoicePoint’s reforms do not bind the company’s 
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competitors, and so other commercial data brokers can continue to sell SSNs and other personal 
information.105   
Second, Choicepoint is still going to sell its unregulated “public records” reports to small 
businesses, albeit with the SSN or driver license “truncated.”106  Large businesses and law 
enforcement will still be able to obtain the full report with sensitive information.  It is not clear 
how the SSN will be truncated.  Some companies obscure the first five digits while others block 
the last four.  Without a full redaction of the SSN, it may be possible to piece the SSN together 
from several sources.   
Third, these public records reports sold by Choicepoint have been shown to be highly 
inaccurate.  According to a report by Pam Dixon of the World Privacy Forum,  Choicepoint’s 
public information reports have a very high error rate.  In her sample, 90% of the reports 
obtained contained errors; frequently these errors were serious, such as individuals being 
identified by the wrong sex.107  Dixon’s initial findings are supported by anecdotal stories of 
other individuals who have obtained their unregulated Choicepont reports.  Elizabeth Rosen, a 
victim of the Choicepoint privacy breach, found that five of the six pages of her report contained 
errors.108 Rosen’s report erroneously indicated that she was the officer of businesses in Texas, 
that she maintained a private mail box at “Mailboxes Etc.,” and that she owned businesses, 
including a “Zach’s Cheese and Deli.”  Privacy researcher Richard Smith obtained his 
Choicepoint report and wrote that his report “contain[ed] more misinformation than correct 
information.”109 Deborah Pierce’s National Comprehensive Report from ChoicePoint falsely 
indicated a “possible Texas criminal history.”110 
Fourth, individuals will have access, but not correction rights with respect to 
Choicepoint’s unregulated public information reports. Choicepoint claims that they cannot 
correct these reports because they are generated from public records. However, this claim is 
deceptive--the problem is that Choicepoint is mixing up public record information between 
individuals.  The public records are correct, but they are attached to people to whom they do not 
pertain.   
Fifth, nothing binds Choicepoint to its promise to maintain its reformed policies. In 
recent years, many large companies including eBay.com, Amazon.com, drkoop.com, and 
yahoo.com changed users’ privacy settings or altered privacy policies to the detriment of 
users.111  Choicepoint is legally in a better position to renege on its promises, as it does not 
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acknowledge a direct relationship with consumers that could be the basis of a legal action.  
Choicepoint’s “consumers” are the businesses that buy data from the company. 
Sixth, Choicepoint still is reserving the right to sell “sensitive” personal information to 
businesses in a large number of contexts.  Choicepoint’s release states that sensitive information 
will be sold to “[s]upport consumer-driven transactions where the data is needed to complete or 
maintain relationships . . .[p]rovide authentication or fraud prevention tools to large, accredited 
corporate customers where consumers have existing relationships . . . [a]ssist federal, state and 
local government and criminal justice agencies in their important missions.”    These categories 
articulated by Choicepoint are broad and ill-defined.  What specifically falls under “consumer-
driven transactions”? When is data “needed to complete or maintain relationships?”  Under this 
standard, Choicepoint can decide what a consumer benefit is.  In the past, Choicepoint has 
declared that selling personal information benefits consumers in the aggregate, and thus 
individuals should have no right to opt-out of Choicepoint’s databases.112  Simply put, 
Choicepoint’s idea of what benefits consumers differs from what consumers and consumers 
advocates think benefits them. 
Seventh, the Choicepoint policy allows the company to sell full reports for anti-fraud 
purposes.  While in theory this exception seems appropriate, almost any transaction can have 
some fraud risk.  If a broad fraud exemption is maintained, it will allow the sale of reports even 
when the fraud risk is minimal or a proxy for wishing to collect information for some other 
purpose. 
Finally, Choicepoint’s proposal does not at all limit sale of personal information to law 
enforcement.  The company continues to sell personal information to 7,000 federal, state, and 
local law enforcement agencies.113 
 
B. Comments on Specific Proposals 
 
1. Universal Notice.  Eric Goldman questions the breadth of the definition in this 
proposal, and notes that “virtually every Internet company would be covered by the standard.”114  
We disagree that the standard would cover virtually any Internet company.  It would cover any 
company that has a primary business of selling personal information.   
Jim Horning, Chief Scientist at McAfee Research,115 comments that in light of the digital 
divide, notice should be available to those who are not online.  As our original proposal was 
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based on the use of a website to provide such notice, we have adjusted the Universal Notice 
section to ensure that those offline also receive notice. 
An anonymous commentator who works in the credit industry writes that the definition of 
commercial data broker should not include consumer reporting agencies because “they are well 
known and they have specific obligations that cover most of the concerns enumerated in your 
paper.” 116  We agree with this assessment.  The purpose of the Model Regime is primarily to 
expand the duties on companies that have functions falling outside the FCRA.  However, some 
portions of the Model Regime do impose greater responsibilities on traditional consumer 
reporting agencies, such as proposal #4. 
. 
2. Meaningful Informed Consent.  Rich Kulawiec, Internet Security Architect at Fire on 
the Mountain, LLC, suggests that the exemption to consent for fraud investigations is too broad, 
and that individuals should receive notice when an investigation does not result in a finding of 
fraud.117  Kulawiec argues that this would prevent baseless uses of data for anti-fraud purposes, 
and allow people to correct data that led the business to suspect fraud.  We adjusted this principle 
to allow use without consent for “reasonable” fraud investigations.  Providing notice each time a 
company used data to perform some anti-fraud function would be burdensome, and we think 
requiring a condition of reasonableness to investigations will prevent arbitrary uses of personal 
information under the exemption. 
 
3. One-Step Exercise of Rights. “Curt Sampson,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s 
blog,118 and Jim Horning make a number of important points regarding the security of any 
centralized source created to manage privacy rights.  Sampson correctly points out that such a 
system will have problems in identifying and authenticating individuals who seek access to it.  In 
lieu of such a system, Sampson proposes that commercial data brokers adopt an opt-in business 
model, where they have to contact the data subjects and establish relationship with each one.  We 
believe that such an alternative might result in a barrage of unwanted contact to individuals given 
the many companies that trade in people’s data.  Many of the identification and authentication 
issues Sampson raises are addressed successfully by the FTC in its Do-Not-Call Telemarketing 
Registry.  The FTC uses “automatic number identification” to verify that an individual enrolling 
in the system is calling from the affected number.   
Serious security issues are not presented by requiring the commercial data brokers to 
register and provide information about their activities online.  The security issues arise when 
individuals can exercise rights at the registry.  This can be addressed in several ways.  With 
respect to the congressionally-mandated central source for free consumer reports, the individual 
can go to a single web site, but then be passed off to an individual consumer reporting agency for 
identification and authentication.  A privacy registry could operate in the same way, with the 
individual reading about different commercial data brokers on the central registry, but then 
pursing the exercise of certain rights (especially access and correction) with the individual 
companies.   
In some instances, the harms from abuse are not significant enough to outweigh the 
benefits of a central registry.  For instance, some direct marketing groups objected to the Do-
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Not-Call Registry on the basis that an imposter could secretly opt-out individuals by placing 
them on the Do-Not-Call Registry without their consent.  We think the FTC properly resolved 
this conflict by still allowing individuals to opt-out without the hassle of burdensome 
authentication because missing some telemarketing is an acceptable harm in exchange for ease of 
use.  Similarly, with respect to opting out of financial services information sharing, there should 
not be significant hurdles or the requirement to go to each individual company to authenticate 
and opt out.  Instead, the FTC could monitor enrollments in the system, and investigate those that 
appear to have a fraudulent pattern (multiple opt outs from the same IP address, opt outs that 
come in alphabetical or numerical order, etc).   
To address Curt Samson’s concerns, we have adjusted the Model Regime so that certain 
rights can be exercised at the centralized system, but others will have to pursued with individual 
companies.   
“David Mohring,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, raises a different issue with the 
centralized source: it could become a honeypot for law enforcement and lawyers seeking 
personal information.  This indeed is a risk.  The FTC, in creating the Do-Not-Call Registry, 
established a routine use allowing the agency to disclose enrollment information to law 
enforcement agencies.119  To avoid a similar development with respect to any newly-created 
system, we have altered the Model Regime to specify that government officials seeking access to 
personal information in the registration system be required to obtain a search warrant with 
probable cause and to minimize the data acquisition to only that needed for a specifically-
identified law enforcement purpose. 
Rich Kulawiec comments that the Do-Not-Call Registry has a feedback loop that our 
system lacks.  That is, if one continues to receive telemarketing after enrollment, there is a 
possibility that someone is violating the law.  He rightly asks what mechanisms will ensure 
compliance with our proposed system.  This is a legitimate concern, but a fully developed 
approach would create rights that would help individuals identify when something wrong is 
afoot, and strong penalties (suggested by many who commented on the Model Regime) would 
serve as a deterrence to prevent misuse of personal data.  To further develop a feedback 
mechanism for individuals as data subjects, we have added a provision to the access section 
calling upon commercial data brokers to not only provide a copy of a report, but also an 
accounting of the entities to which it has been disclosed.  This right exists in the FCRA context, 
where the individual can obtain a complete list of all entities that received a consumer report.120  
Therefore, in the access and accuracy section (proposal #5), we have added a provision to enable 
an individual to seek such an accounting of a commercial data broker’s disclosures.  
 
4. Individual Credit Management. “No id please,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s 
blog, notes that credit card companies have architected the current credit system that has put 
consumers at risk, and then turned this risk into a business opportunity to market credit 
monitoring.  This comment is correct—the information business has turned many of its problems 
into new profit opportunities, such as identity theft insurance, which can cover lost wages and 
fees associated with remedying the crime.  Dennis Bailey observes: “I use CreditWatch from 
Experian and it gives me peace of mind.  Of course [Solove and Hoofnagle] are asking the 
companies to give away a profitable service for free.”121  It strikes us as unfair for companies to 
                                                 
119 Id. 
120 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (b)(2). 
121 Dennis Bailey, The Whole Kit and Caboodle – Solove and Hoofnagle Go for Regime Change, 
SOLOVE & HOOFNAGLE   MODEL PRIVACY REGIME 
 30 
make a profit selling a service to protect consumers from problems created by these very 
companies themselves. Consumer reporting agencies contend that people’s information would be 
much more safe and secure if they signed up for their credit monitoring services.122  However, 
under theFCRA, consumer reporting agencies are required to maintain procedures to ensure 
“maximum possible accuracy,” and nowhere in the statute does it authorize companies to charge 
a fee for such service.123  We believe that under their FCRA duty to maintain the maximum 
possible accuracy, consumer reporting agencies should be providing free credit monitoring to 
individuals.124  Therefore, we have added to this provision free credit monitoring to individuals 
who desire it.   
“Matthew B,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, argues in support of the security 
freeze proposal.  He points out that it will serve as an effective identity theft “detection 
approach” because it will notify individuals where there may be wrongdoing.  Such an approach 
is useful because in a typical identity theft situation, the impostor will make a number of 
attempts to apply for credit in the victim’s name.  Notice of inquiries will alert an individual to 
wrongdoing; the freeze will stop the actual granting of credit, assuming that the impostor cannot 
himself lift the freeze. 
Rich Kulawiec suggests that notice of access or attempted access to personal information 
not be delivered by e-mail because of security risks.  Our approach would give the individual a 
choice regarding which method of notice could be used; those concerned about e-mail security 
could choose notice by postal mail. 
An anonymous commentator who works in the credit industry writes that “[r]equiring a 
notice to be sent by a . . . [consumer reporting agency] . . . each time someone makes an inquiry 
or accesses your consumer report is just not practical.”125  The anonymous commentator is 
correct.  Our original proposal would have required notice to be given each time a company does 
a routine review of an existing consumer’s credit.  The Model Regime is not concerned with 
routine account review, but rather with new accounts of credit and new inquiries made on the 
file.  We have accordingly altered the Model Regime so that new persons or entities (those that 
do not currently have a business relationship with the consumer) that access or make an inquiry 
on the report will trigger a notice to the consumer. 
The same commentator writes that “[a]llowing full consumer control over their credit file 
. . . is not practical . . . .because [of] the need to have a center available 24/7/365 to allow 
consumers to have access to their file.”  This would “create a cost structure that would destroy 
the industry.”  Certainly there will be costs involved with credit freeze, but under the current 
information architecture, individuals have no tools to proactively shield themselves from identity 
theft.  There are certain pressure points that can be used to address identity theft.  One is limiting 
access to personal information, an approach that commercial data brokers have made impractical.  
The other approach is to limit access to the consumer report, because without it, companies will 
not grant credit to impostors.  We think consumers should have the ability to limit access to the 
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reports.  An increasing number of states are in accord with this position.126 
 
5. Access to and Accuracy of Personal Information.  Michael Sankey correctly notes 
that our original proposal justified access, accuracy, and correction rights by listing uses of 
personal information (pre-employment screening and credit granting) that are already regulated 
and subject to the very rights we seek.  Our reliance on those uses of information was misplaced, 
and thus we have removed those justifications.  We still think that these rights are appropriate for 
reports sold by commercial data brokers, as law enforcement and other entities use them to make 
decisions about people’s lives. 
Sankey also comments that correction rights are difficult to execute, because the 
“originating data comes from the government agencies [and] the database vendor is merely 
reporting what was in the record.”127  While it is true that individuals have to pursue correction 
rights with individual government agencies, as noted above, much of the problem stems from the 
fact that although the public records are correct, they are attached to the wrong individuals.  
 
6. Secure Identification.  “Anonymous,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, warns 
that legislative mandates defining security can cause problems because they stifle innovation and 
technological development.128  We agree with this comment.  In our Model Regime, we avoided 
specifying specific security standards.  Privacy laws that address security standards rarely define 
specific security measures, but place a burden to maintain “reasonable procedures.”  These 
standards place a continuing burden upon data collectors to employ good practices rather than set 
the standards in stone.  However, this does not mean that the law must avoid all specific 
measures.  In particular, some existing security measures have proven to be ineffective – such as 
the use of SSNs as passwords – that they should be specifically limited.  There may be some 
security measures that have proven so effective that they should be required.  Such instances 
should be employed sparingly, as the law should maximize flexibility and continued security 
innovation.   
“Gary,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, suggests that the SSN be made public, 
but that the law should prohibit its use as a password.129  We agree that the SSN should not be 
used as a password. However, the SSN is an individual’s “account number” with the Social 
Security Administration, and making such a financial account number public could create 
opportunities for fraud and abuse   
Jim Horning and several others are critical of the employment of passwords.130  Users 
choose bad passwords; they tend to use the same password for many different purposes; and they 
forget good passwords.  All of these problems are valid concerns, but the current system is a 
password system that is among the worst that could possibly be devised.  SSNs are used as 
                                                 
126 California, Louisiana, Texas, and Vermont have credit freeze laws.  See Cal. Civil Code § 1785.11.2-1785.11.6; 
La. R.S. 9:3571.1; Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 20.01 et seq; 9 V.S.A. § 2480a (effective July 1, 2005). 
127 E-mail from Michael Sankey, Mar. 3, 2005 (on file with authors). 
128 Anonymous, Comments to Bruce Schneier, ChoicePoint Says “Please Regulate Me”, Mar. 9, 2005, 
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/03/choicepoint_say.html. 
129 This proposal resembles in some respect Lynn LoPucki’s proposal to have a public system of identification.  
Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 89 (2001).  For an 
extensive critique of LoPucki’s system, see Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of 
Vulnerability, 54 Hastings L.J. 1227 (2003). For LoPucki’s response, see Lynn LoPucki, Did Privacy Cause Identity 
Theft?, 54 Hastings L.J. 1277 (2003).    
130 Horning email, supra, and Email from Scott Minneman to Daniel Solove (Mar. 11, 2005) (on file with authors).  
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passwords; they are far from secret; they can readily be found out with minimal effort; they are 
very difficult to change; and they are used on countless accounts and record systems.  The Model 
Regime’s password proposal eliminates several of these problems.  First, passwords will vary 
with different accounts, so a thief’s finding out a password will not unlock everything.  Second, 
passwords can readily be changed, so once the identity theft is detected, people can readily 
render the stolen password useless.  Third, it will be much more difficult for the average identity 
thief to guess people’s passwords.  Of course, thieves can do this, but it will make identity thefts 
more difficult.  It is difficult to completely eliminate identity theft, but the Model Regime makes 
it much harder to engage in and makes it easier for victims to halt it once it happens.  The 
problem of forgetting passwords can be addressed by having people supply answers to questions 
such as naming their favorite pet’s name or favorite color.    
We have received some interesting technological solutions for identification and 
authentication, but we were reluctant to adopt any without a more throughout understanding of 
their implications, feasibility, usability, and potential problems.131  We are open to other 
approaches that provide more flexibility and security than passwords.  For now, we believe that 
passwords are an easy measure that will have a significant impact on reducing the incidence and 
severity of identity theft.  While such a solution is not perfect, its great virtue is that it supplies a 
substantial advance in effectiveness with relative simplicity. 
 
7. Disclosure of Security Breaches.  Eric Goldman suggests that individuals be able to 
control whether security breach notifications are received, and the standard for receiving 
notifications should be opt in.  We agree that individuals should be able to opt out of receiving 
notifications, should they wish. However, setting an opt in standard will give companies an 
incentive to hide the option from the consumer, or charge consumers for receiving this basic 
information.   
 
8. Social Security Number Use Limitation.  Many wrote to express support of this 
provision in particular.  Several wrote that the SSN should be consider compromised because of 
its widespread use and availability.  Thus, it should never be used as a password. 
 
9. Access and Use Restrictions for Public Records.  No commentary. 
 
10. Curbing Excessive Uses of Background Checks.  Jim Horning argues that the 
background check section is not relevant to the problems we aimed to address in the Model 
Regime.  However, the growth of the commercial databroker industry has been in large part due 
to employers performing background checks, even in cases where the job has no security 
function.  Outside the pre-employment context, shoddy, electronic-only background checks have 
become increasingly less expensive.  There has to be some way to put balance back into this 
situation and limit the contexts in which background checks should be performed. 
Dennis Bailey contends that many non-security jobs could have security implications; he 
gives the example of felons working for service companies that might assault people in their 
                                                 
131  For example, Jim Horning suggested “PwdHash” as one possible approach to addressing the problem of using 
the same password for different services.  Web Password Hashing, http://crypto.stanford.edu/PwdHash/ (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2005).  PwdHash “is an Internet Explorer plug-in that transparently converts a user’s password into a 
domain-specific password.”  This would reduce the risk associated with individuals using the same password at 
different websites. 
SOLOVE & HOOFNAGLE   MODEL PRIVACY REGIME 
 33 
homes.  We think that some line must be drawn that establishes categories of jobs that are 
available without a background check.  Almost any job imaginable has some security 
implication, but the connection is often attenuated.  We think the line that we have drawn, one 
that allows background checks for caretakers, handlers of large sums of money, and for functions 
articulated by Congress in the Polygraph Act, properly balances employer and employee 
interests.   
Michael Sankey of BRB Publications, Inc. criticizes the background check section, and 
notes that “the employer can be sued for negligent hiring if [pre-employment screens] are not 
done.”132  We think this is precisely the reason why a line must be drawn.  As pre-employment 
screening becomes cheaper, it becomes difficult for employers to refrain from engaging in pre-
screening.  One could foresee the day when even the most menial job will require a clean record.   
 
11. Private Investigators.  Jim Horning recommends against limiting the private 
investigator profession, arguing that private investigators are not central to the problems at issue 
in the Model Regime.  We disagree.  Private investigators are frequent users of the information 
provided by data brokers.  Too little is known about this industry.  Certainly, there are beneficial 
examples of private investigators using personal information (i.e., to locate lost children).  But 
private investigators engage in other practices that the public is largely unaware of.  Moreover, 
there are many instances of private investigators assisting unscrupulous individuals, stalkers, and 
others bent on violence.  For example, the stalker who murdered Rebecca Shaeffer obtained her 
address from a private investigator.133  We believe that because private investigators engage in a 
significant amount of personal information use that they should be subject to the Model Regime 
just as other principal users of such data are.  Failure to address private investigators would leave 
a significant gap in protection.    
 
12. Limiting Government Access to Business and Financial Records. Michael Sankey 
questions the logic of this section. He notes that requiring the government to obtain court process 
“is extremely time consuming and costly” and that the government “can utilize the services of a 
private sector public record database vendors to do the same search of the same government 
agencies in a fraction of the time for a fraction of the cost.”134  But this is exactly our point—
access and aggregation have tipped the scale of power away from the individual to the 
government.  Using public records or information volunteered from private companies, the 
government can learn much more about its citizens than it could a century or even a decade ago.   
 
13. Government Data Mining.  The section on government data mining has received 
much attention from commentators.  Jim Harper argues in support of our proposal that “to the 
extent [that data mining] means sifting through databases trying to discover incipient 
wrongdoing . . . [it is] probably ineffective.”135 Others criticize the proposal, arguing that the 
government should be able to employ the same tools that the private sector uses for marketing.  
For example, Dennis Bailey argues that restricting government data mining would “keep 
                                                 
132 Email from Michael Sankey, BRB Publications, Inc., Mar. 3, 2005 (on file with authors). 
133 139 Cong. Rec. S15762 (Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Senator Barbara Boxer).  
134 Sankey email, supra. 
135 Email from Jim Harper to Declan McCullagh, Chris Hoofnagle, and Daniel Solove (Mar. 14, 2005) (on file with 
authors).  
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government inefficient by depriving it of tools from the private sector.”136 Some of the criticism, 
we think, flows from a misunderstanding of our proposal.   We have proposed limits on data 
mining for prospective wrongdoing.  Data mining regularly occurs, and with good reason, to 
address crimes that have already occurred (a form of data matching was used to help identify the 
Washington, DC-area sniper, for instance).  Data mining prospectively to interdict future crimes 
raises profound due process questions, and it is that practice that we have sought to address in 
this principle.   
In his book, Dennis Bailey elaborates on his support for government data mining and 
contends that the problems created by data mining can be minimized by avoiding a “centralized 
data warehouse.”137  Bailey observes that the government could search multiple databases with a 
subpoena or court order and “[o]nly when a suspicious pattern turned up would an individual be 
identified, most likely after court approval was obtained.”138  This suggestion resembles one 
made in the Markle Report, which recommends against centralization such as in the Total 
Information Awareness program.  According to the Markle Report, “[a]ttempting to centralize 
this information is not the answer because it would not link the information to the dispersed 
analytical capabilities of the network.”139  In other words, the Report suggests that the 
government enlist the assistance of various companies and other entities to conduct the data 
mining.  Moreover, the Report recommends that “personally identifiable data can be anonymized 
so that personal data is not seen unless and until the requisite showing . . . is made.”140 The 
problem with this suggestion is that merely decentralizing the databases does not provide 
adequate protection when such information can readily be combined at the push of a button.  
Such outsourcing of government intelligence functions presents other problems as well, as 
private sector entities lack the openness and accountability of government as well as the legal 
limitations on the collection and use of personal data.  Anonymizing the identities of data 
subjects and searching for patterns only to identify those suspicious people still involves a 
dragnet search.  Concealing the names at the stage of the initial pattern analysis will provide little 
meaningful protection because they do not change the dragnet nature of the search and because 
the searches for patterns are conducted by computers for which the names of the individuals will 
not be relevant anyway.    
 
14. Control of Government Maintenance of Personal Information.   Jim Harper 
observes in agreement that the Privacy Act requires significant revision because the Act “is a 
paper tiger.”  Harper contends that the Act must be revised “especially in light of the end-run 
made possible by companies like ChoicePoint who do the dossier-building that the Privacy Act is 
meant to prevent.”141  
 
15. Preserving the Innovative Role of the States.  Preemption continues to be one of 
the more controversial proposals in the Model Regime.  Eric Goldman writes, “[s]tates have no 
business trying to regulate privacy. . . . . State-based regulation creates a patchwork-quilt of laws 
                                                 
136 Bailey email, supra.   
137 DENNIS BAILEY, THE OPEN SOCIETY PARADOX 110 (2004). 
138 Id. 
139 MARKLE FOUNDATION, CREATING A TRUSTED INFORMATION NETWORK FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 14 (Dec. 
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that cannot be reconciled, leading to unnecessary costs or a most-restrictive compliance 
strategy.”142   
Government and businesses have struggled for centuries to draw appropriate lines 
between state and federal regulation.  To simply say that the information privacy cannot be 
subject to state consumer protection law begs many questions.  The state has played a large 
historical role in protecting consumers.  Why should such a role be rejected in the context of 
information privacy?  What is so unique about e-commerce that justifies treating it differently 
than other interstate commerce, such as catalog sales?  
At some level, there is an inconsistency between the databroker industry’s declarations of 
their technological capabilities to engage in personalization and customization with consumer 
data and their asserted inability to use this same technology to comply with differing state 
consumer privacy laws.  Numerous other industries have faced differing state laws and have 
found ways to comply.  For example, the insurance industry has demonstrated that it can offer 
state-specific quotes online, despite the fact that the industry is regulated by all 50 states.  In light 
of this, we remain skeptical that compliance with a “patchwork” is impossible. 
Moreover, complaints about the difficulties in following the law of all 50 states are often 
really disguised attacks on the law of just a few states, such as California.  In many cases, only 
one or two states have laws addressing a particular issue that diverge from the norm (or even 
have such laws at all).  Ed Mierzwinski of U.S. PIRG comments that a patchwork of state laws is 
not likely if Congress “does a good enough job.”143  Mierzwinski reasons that if Congress passes 
effective laws, the states will focus on other problems than privacy. 
Historically, federal privacy laws have not preempted stronger state protections or 
enforcement efforts. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Right to Financial Privacy 
Act, the Cable Communications Privacy Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act, the Employee 
Polygraph Protection Act, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act all allow states to craft protections that exceed 
federal law.144  Even the FCRA allows for stronger state law in many circumstances. 145 
Although the federal government has enacted privacy laws, most privacy legislation in 
the United States is enacted at the state level. Many states have privacy legislation on 
employment privacy (drug testing, background checks, employment records), SSNs, video rental 
data, consumer reporting, cable television records, arrest and conviction records, student records, 
tax records, wiretapping, video surveillance, identity theft, library records, financial records, 
insurance records, privileges (relationships between individuals that entitle communications to 
privacy), and medical records.146 
States have engaged in significant innovation in addressing consumer protection and 
privacy issues.  It was the states, not the FTC, that first acted to create telemarketing do-not-call 
lists.  Ed Mierzwinski of U.S. PIRG comments that “the vast majority of 2003 federal FACTA 
[Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act] reforms were first passed in the states.” 147   
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Jim Harper suggests that federal law should neither be a ceiling or a floor, allowing states 
to regulate upward or downward—that is, provide their citizens more or less privacy.148  Harper 
reasons that many people choose to have their privacy invaded, and thus states should be able to 
make the choice to provide their citizens less privacy protection.  Such a system, however, would 
depart significantly from the general approach of federal regulation, which provides a minimum 
floor of protections.  Under Harper’s suggestion, federal law would amount to little more than a 
recommendation, a guideline that could be followed or rejected by the states.  We doubt that 
such a redefinition of the role of federal law would be amenable to Congress.  As for citizens 
choosing to have less privacy protection, we certainly recognize that people may choose different 
degrees of privacy.  We have crafted our Model Regime to afford people meaningful choices 
about their privacy; people are free to reject these if they want.  The goal of privacy regulation is 
to ensure that when people do exercise choice with regard to their privacy protection that such 
choice is a meaningful choice, not a one-sided transaction where people are given few reasonable 
options and not enough information to make an informed decision.   
 
16. Effective Enforcement of Privacy Rights.  Several commentators suggested that 
civil penalties be severe, so as to prevent privacy violations from occurring as a “cost of doing 
business.” 
“Rodolphe Ortalo,” commenting on Bruce Schneier’s blog, suggests that company 
executives be criminally liable for security.  A significant segment of the public agrees that 
criminal liability is appropriate for those who invade privacy.  However, unless there is willful or 
malicious behavior, we think ordinary civil liability will suffice to deter wrongdoing. 
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